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VIEWING AIR BATTLE MANAGEMENT THROUGH THE LENS OF
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Jordan E. Peterson1, John M. McGuirl1, Michael E. Miller1, Danielle Bales2, Brianna Sternitzky3
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Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright Patterson AFB, OH, USA
2
United States Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, CO, USA
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337th Air Control Squadron, Tyndall AFB, FL, USA
Recent work has shown the importance of understanding and supporting
interdependence relationships among agents engaging in complex, joint activities.
Building on the Coactive Design Method of Johnson, the goal of this research was
to determine the impact of providing operators with real-time information of team
interdependencies. It was hypothesized that allowing operators to focus on
maximizing the opportunities for team synergy would result in better planning in a
dynamic environment. Operators in the Air Battle Management field used a
decision aid that provided information on team interdependence during three
combat scenarios. Effectiveness of the decision aid was measured by expert
assessment of the operator’s decisions. The results of this study could help to
inform future training aids and interface design for command and control systems.
Literature Review
Understanding the capabilities of a team requires an understanding of the
interdependence relationships that may exist between the team members (Johnson et al., 2014).
Interdependence relationships are often not obvious because they depend on the nature of the
joint activities the team is conducting, which are often complex and subject to rapid change. A
joint activity requires the support of interdependence relationships which “describes the set of
complementary relationships that two or more parties rely on to manage [coordinate] required
(hard) or opportunistic (soft) dependencies in joint activity” (Johnson et al., 2014 p.56).
These interdependence relationships occur anytime that team members must coordinate
their activities to fulfill a common goal. The activity of coordination results in overhead costs
including costs to diagnose and select coordination activities, communicate coordination
activities, replan coordination activities and time waiting for other entities to complete
prerequisite tasks (Klein et al., 2005). To relieve the individual actors of this overhead, many of
these tasks are delegated to command and control (C2) structures. An example of how this plays
out in a military setting is in Air Battle Management, which involves six core functions: 1)
orienting shooters, 2) pairing shooters, 3) solving dynamic problems, 4) expediting decisions, 5)
bringing order and 6) developing and disseminating assessments to operational command
(Powers, 2018). The individuals responsible for performing these tasks are Air Battle Managers
(ABMs), who must have the ability to maintain good situation awareness, perform resource
allocation, and mission plan under extreme time pressure and uncertainty (Klein, 1998; Klinger
and Gomes, 1993). However, this skill requires time to develop and can be difficult to master.
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As part of the Coactive Design Approach for human-robot teams, a method termed
Interdependence Analysis (IA) was developed to construct systems that can support the
interdependent relationships that exist between human and robotic teammates (Johnson, 2014).
This process uses an IA Table (IAT) that consists of a traditional hierarchical task analysis
decomposition that identifies the tasks to be performed. Multiple teammates having capacities
required for completion each task/subtask, including situation awareness information,
knowledge, skills, and abilities; are assigned to each task. The table further provides an
enumeration of viable team role alternatives along with an assessment of the member’s capacity
to perform and capacity to support the associated taskwork. The table employs a color code that
helps identify potential interdependence relationships among a primary performer and supporting
agents as shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Interdependence Color Scheme, adapted from (Johnson et al., 2014).
Team Member Role Alternatives
Supporting Team Members
I can do it all
My assistance could improve efficiency
I can do it all but my reliability is < 100% My assistance could improve reliability
I can contribute but need assistance
My assistance is required
I cannot do it
I cannot provide assistance
Performer

While the IA method has proven to be an effective tool for design engineers when
developing human-robot teams, this research seeks to extend this work and investigate the utility
of an IAT as a decision aid, capable of supporting operator awareness and management of team
interdependencies as they evolve in real time. Specifically, this work seeks to apply the
interdependence analysis concept and an interdependence table-like representation to represent
the interdependencies among aircraft within air battle management scenarios. The utility of this
tool is then assessed by having newly trained ABMs perform the air battle management task both
with and without the representation.
Methodology
Participants
Eight recent graduates of the Undergraduate ABM training course participated in the
study. They had an average of five months experience post Undergraduate training as ABMs, but
no experience with operational missions. Half of the participants were randomly assigned to
either the control or experimental group.
Scenarios
Three mission scenarios were developed in collaboration with a subject matter expert
(SME). Each scenario presented the operator with unique challenges based on the nature of the
task.
The first scenario was an offensive mission with a defended, stationary target. It was
defined as a time critical target (TCT) with a limited window of opportunity to be destroyed due
to the nature of the threat. Updates regarding the nature and number of defensive units were a
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major complicating factor as they could alter which aircraft was best suited to conduct the strike.
Mechanical issues to certain assets also complicated the asset-target decision process. The
second scenario was an offensive mission requiring a precision strike on a defended, moving
target as it transitioned through areas of varying risk of collateral damage. Depending on the
location, the number of strike options would vary. This scenario was also designed to trigger a
call to abort the mission as a result of the last update. The third scenario was a defensive mission
that focused on protecting a high value asset (airfield) against an unknown number of airborne
adversaries. The evolving weather in the area had the potential to interfere with air operations
and adversely impact sensor capabilities.
Apparatus
All participants were provided with all of the information that is normally available
during a mission to make decisions on assigning assets to mission tasks, such as the mission
objectives, physical map of the area of operations indicating objectives, position of friendly and
known adversaries, the fuel and weapons status and current assignment of each asset. In addition
to this, the experimental group also received the IAT decision aid as shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Except of the IAT Decision Aid with generic entries for tasks and aircraft.
The IAT was designed as a decision aid to support the operator by highlighting team
interdependencies in real-time, specifically those for resource allocation and planning purposes.
It was developed from the use of several Excel macros. There were five main parts to developing
the decision aid: 1) dissecting the mission objectives into subtasks, 2) identify assets and their
capabilities, 3) color-coding the IAT based on the most recent mission update, 4) restricting the
capabilities of assets based on the mission timeline and 5) recommending the most capable asset
to the operator. The color of a cell mapped the ability of the current asset weapons load out and
sensor status to the selected task. To ensure an operator could not assign an asset to two mission
objectives occurring at the same time, the macro would grey out the other mission objective rows
if the asset was assigned to a task. This feature helped the operator keep track of their resource
allocation. Lastly, the IAT made recommendations to the operator by outlining the most capable
assets to fulfill a mission objective in a dark blue. The goal of this feature was to help the
operator save time during assignment of resources to address a time critical target.
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Procedure
The experiment was conducted through Microsoft Teams and took approximately 90
minutes, including a 15 minute briefing, a 60 minute simulation, and 15 minute debriefing. The
experimenter acted as the Air Commander and provided additional information or clarifications
as needed. Each scenario contained ten mission updates designed to trigger critical decision
points around the status of enemy and friendly forces, weather, and other decision factors. The
participants were asked to verbalize their thought process while making any necessary
adjustments to aircraft assignments or ordering the mission to be aborted if deemed necessary. A
debriefing followed to provide further insight into the decision-making process and situation
awareness of the mission scenario.
Results
The performance errors among the results were classified into four categories: 1) Mission
Asset Pairing in which the ABM assigned a mission objective to an aircraft that was better suited
for another aircraft, 2) Crew Coordination in which the ABM did not properly utilize the
interconnected capabilities of assets 3) Knowledge Gap in which they made an inadequate
decision due to a knowledge gap of necessary information, and 4) Assumption Error in which the
ABM assumed inaccurate information. The performance of the experimental and control group
were analyzed for common errors and compared against the correct predicted response from a
SME ABM. No one participant made more than three errors per scenario. The results revealed
that the control group made more errors of all types in total and across each mission.
Figure 2 shows the results from scenario one, which involved an offensive mission with a
stationary target. No one in the control group completed the mission. Three of four participants
aborted the mission by Update 9. The final participant was unable to successfully select an
aircraft to perform combat assessment of the target during the tenth update. In comparison, all
four of the participants in the control group successfully completed the mission. These results
highlight the utility of the decision aid to help the participant keep track of their assets as the
mission evolves.
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Figure 2. Participant’s Errors during each mission update for Scenario One, color indicates
error type.
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During the second scenario, involving the precision strike on a moving target, all
participants performed well until the last update. No errors were made by the experimental
group. However, three of four participants in the control group made a knowledge gap error on
Update 10. This update changed the capabilities of assets due to inclement weather. The Air
Commander informed all participants that the target was unable to be detected by any aircraft.
Participants in the experimental group were able to use the decision aid to recognize the
environmental effects on their asset capabilities. This led to four of four participants making a
decision that aligned with the SME’s assessment. However, three of four participants in the
control group left aircraft hovering over the target in extreme weather conditions due to
knowledge gap of aircraft weather capabilities. The responses to this update emphasize how the
decision aid can be useful for novice trainees with knowledge gaps from training when making
operational decisions.
The third scenario, which focused on defense of an airfield, resulted in the most
performance errors. During this scenario, as the updates occurred, the participants were
presented with more and more enemy aircraft in the airspace, eventually leading an
overwhelming large number of enemy aircraft to be tracked and targeted. The experimental
group was able to quickly recognize which assets were able to perform air-to-air defense, while
most control group participants were hesitant and made inaccurate assumptions. These results
suggest the decision aid was helpful for resource allocation in a task saturated environment.
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Figure 3. Participant Errors during each mission update for Scenario Three, color indicates
error type.
Discussion and Conclusion
As shown in Figures 2 and 3, participants in both groups generally performed well
initially in all of the scenarios, however, as the missions continued, more participants in the
control group struggled to keep track of their asset capabilities, perform efficient resource
allocation, and mission plan. For example, in scenario one, as the number of updates increased so
did the number of errors for the control group. It became very difficult for these individuals to
keep track of their asset capabilities, which resulted in aborted missions. In scenario two, the Air
Commander had more control of assigning aircraft to tasks, which led to fewer errors. However,
on the last update, three of the four participants in the control group lacked knowledge of asset
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weather capabilities and made poor decisions. Lastly, on scenario three, several assumption
errors occurred due to the defensive mission type. Students are trained to target enemy aircraft
when they reach a particular area of engagement. These participants made inaccurate
assumptions about enemy locations and aircraft weapon capabilities. These results highlight how
the decision aid was able to support all of these decisions.
Feedback from the participants suggested that having the information on how team
interdependencies were changing over time improved their situation awareness, enhanced their
resource allocation decisions and ability to plan missions. They also stated that the aid helped
them understand how their time critical decisions can have cascading effects on the ability to
accomplish competing tasks, ultimately saving time, resources, and increasing resilience.
Future Work
While the results showed some promise for this approach, it was limited to a specific
domain and a small subset of AF operators. Future work should focus on increasing the fidelity
of the interface, incorporating more complex scenarios, including multiple participants, and
potentially artificial agents.
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